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BINATIONAL GUESTWORKER UNIONS:
MOVING GUESTWORKERS INTO
THE HOUSE OF LABOR
Jennifer Hill*
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1990s, Francisco Hernandez Juarez, head of the Mexi-
can telephone workers’ union, proposed the establishment of “an
International Union for Migrant Workers.”1  This idea never came
to fruition, but the recent success of three unions in organizing
groups of agricultural guestworkers2 again raises the question of
how unions might best represent workers who cross borders for
employment.
Agricultural guestworkers are temporary employees hired in
their home country who travel to the host country to work for a
limited period of time.  Under U.S. and Canadian immigration
laws, agricultural guestworkers are intended to fill positions when a
shortage of domestic workers exists.3  Each country’s guestworker
* B.A., Bryn Mawr College, 1986; M.A., George Washington University, 1992;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007; Skadden Fellow and Staff Attorney,
Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Miami, Florida.  Thanks for generous assistance
and guidance to Fran Ansley, Chris McCrudden, Jennifer Gordon, Minsu Longiaru,
Kate Griffith, Carol Pier, J.J. Prescott, Rachel Micah-Jones, Ben Davis, Anna Fink,
Alejandra Ancheita, Tory Gavito, Liz O’Connor, Rob Howse, Ian Robinson, Doug
Stevick, J.J. Rosenbaum, Lance Compa, Paul Baldauf, Sarah Zearfoss, and the editors
of this journal.  Thanks for extraordinary work on behalf of guestworkers to the un-
ions involved in guestworker organizing; Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, CDM;
Proyecto de Derechos Economicos, Sociales, y Culturales, ProDESC; Southern Mi-
grant Legal Services; Southern Poverty Law Center; and the American Center for
International Labor Solidarity.  Special thanks to Jennifer Gordon both for her
groundbreaking work and special generosity in reviewing and commenting on an ear-
lier draft.  Special thanks to Kate Griffith and Carol Pier for help understanding ele-
ments of Mexican labor law.
1. Julie Watts, Mexico-U.S. Migration and Labor Unions: Obstacles to Building
Cross-Border Solidarity 11 (The Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Univ. of
Cal. San Diego, Working Paper No. 79, 2003).
2. The Farm Labor Organizing Committee and United Farm Workers unions or-
ganized bargaining units of guestworkers in the United States, and the United Food
and Commercial Workers won representation elections in Canada. See infra Part I.D.
3. In the U.S., the H-2A program is established by the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2006).  For the Canadian program, see
COMM’N FOR LABOR COOPERATION, PROTECTION OF MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS IN CANADA, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (2002) [hereinafter
PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS] (citing Memorandum of Understanding
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program includes provisions that make guestworkers more expen-
sive to hire than workers already in the host country; the goal is to
ensure that domestic workers and labor standards are not
undermined.
Unions generally have not seen guestworkers as either desirable
or feasible groups for organizing.4  In fact, unions often opposed
guestworker programs, arguing that employers facing a shortage
should improve wages and working conditions to attract domestic
workers rather than import others.5  In addition to being undesir-
(“MOU”) between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning the Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program,
1974), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/study4.pdf  (explaining that work-
ers are authorized to enter “under section 10(c) of the Immigration Act and the Im-
migration Regulations, 1978. . . .  Section 20 of the Regulations permits the entry into
Canada of foreign workers in accordance with international agreements between Ca-
nada and one or more foreign country”).
4. Guestworker programs are neither new nor primarily a North American phe-
nomenon.  For a complete overview of guestworker programs, including the attitudes
of unions, see CINDY HAHAMOVITCH, THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR:  ATLANTIC
COAST FARMWORKERS AND THE MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY: 1870-1945 (Univ.
of N.C. Press 1997) [hereinafter HAHAMOVITCH, FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR]. See gen-
erally Cindy Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants:  Guestworkers of the World in
Historical Perspective 1, in 44 LABOR HIST. 69 (2003) [hereinafter Hahamovitch, Cre-
ating Perfect Immigrants]; GUNTHER PECK, REINVENTING FREE LABOR:  PADRONES
AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST, 1880-1930 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (Princeton Univ. Press 2004); Emily B. White, How
We Treat Our Guests: Mobilizing Employment Discrimination Protections in a Guest
Worker Program, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269 (2007).
5. Union opposition has been common, if not universal, and has been couched in
terms of support for domestic workers and, more recently, support for guestworker
rights. See Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants, supra note 4, at 79-88 (describ-
ing many European and North American unions’ efforts starting in the early twenti-
eth century to minimize guestworker use by advocating for mechanisms that made
guestworkers as costly and temporary as possible).  Many U.S. unions—though not
all—have opposed expansion of guestworker programs in recent years, arguing in part
that guestworkers’ rights must be more effectively protected to win union support.
See, e.g., AFL-CIO Executive Council, Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws
Must Protect Working Conditions for all Workers in the U.S. (March 1, 2006), http://
www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec02272006e.cfm.
The traditional progressive opposition to guestwork, among unionists and immigrant
rights activists, has changed. See Manuel Pastor & Susan Alva, Guest Workers and the
New Transnationalism:  Possibilities and Realities in an Age of Repression, 31 SOC.
JUST. 92, 94 (2004) (describing the results of interviews and stating “[a]ctivists ex-
pressed the usual worries about labor exploitation, but they also recognized that per-
manent residence might not be the goal of some immigrant workers and that creating
easier mechanisms for such transnational existence might therefore be important”);
see also Rachel L. Swarns, Union Leader Supporting Guest Worker Proposal, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at A14 (describing the statements of “Eliseo Medina, [who] is
vice president of the Service Employees International Union, the nation’s second-
largest union.  He is also an advocate of one of President Bush’s most contentious
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able, guestworkers have been seen as largely “unorganizeable” be-
cause they are hyper-contingent workers—inherently temporary,
dependent on employers for jobs and immigration authorization,
and often isolated because of geography or language.6
The view that guestworkers are impossible to organize has
changed, at least among agricultural worker unions.  In the United
States, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (“FLOC”) won
union recognition for roughly 8500 guestworkers employed by the
North Carolina Growers Association (“NCGA”) in 2004, and the
United Farm Workers (“UFW”) organized 3000 employees work-
ing for Global Horizons in 2006.7  In 2006, the United Food and
Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) in Canada organized several
farms as part of a long-term outreach program.8  These successes
stand out in the midst of declining overall union density numbers9
proposals:  the effort to legalize 11 million illegal immigrants and create what could be
the largest temporary guest worker program for foreigners in more than 40 years.”).
6. Guestworkers are like “super-temps,” workers whose job and work authoriza-
tion are contingent. See VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS’ UNIONS:  REBUILDING LA-
BOR FROM BELOW 7 (South End Press 2005) (“Many in the traditional labor
movement did not believe poor workers could be organized, either because of their
fluctuating job status, or because of prejudices against their race, ethnicity, gender,
poverty, or immigration status.”); Eve S. Weinbaum, Organizing Labor in an Era of
Contingent Work and Globalization, in WHICH DIRECTION FOR ORGANIZED LABOR?
37, 39 (Bruce Nissen ed., 1999) (describing the move to contingent work as having a
“devastating” impact on unions) .
7. For descriptions of the FLOC campaign, see Julie M. McKinnon, FLOC Sets
its Sights on Future Fights, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 3, 2004; see also Steven Greenhouse,
Growers’ Group Signs the First Union Contract for Guest Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2004, at A16 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Growers’ Group].  For information about
the UFW campaign, see Steven Greenhouse, Farmworkers’ Union Is Set to Announce
First National Contract for Guest Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at A17 [herein-
after Greenhouse, Farmworkers’ Union]; see also H-2A, H-2B Programs, 12 RURAL
MIGRATION NEWS (2006), available at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/comments.
php?id=1157_0_4_0; Paul Nyhan, Guest Farm Workers Get Contract,  SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/266
352_farmworker12.html; Andrew Sirocchi, Global Horizons to Unionize With United
Farm Workers, TRI-CITY HERALD, Apr. 16, 2006, available at http://www.tri-cityher-
ald.com/tch/local/story/7619848p-7531663c.html
8. See Man., Que. Migrant Workers Vote to Join Union; Similar Vote Unlikely in
Ont., WOODSTOCK SENTINEL-REVIEW, Sept. 22, 2006, at 2 [hereinafter Man., Que.
Migrant Workers]; Migrant Workers Vote on Union Membership; Working Conditions,
Wages Top Issues, WINNIPEG SUN, Sept. 22, 2006, at 34; Press Release, UFCW Ca-
nada, Manitoba Labour Board Says Migrant Farm Workers Can Join UFCW Canada
(June 26, 2007), http://www.ufcw.ca/Default.aspx?SectionId=af80f8cf-ddd2-4b12-9f41-
641ea94d4fa4&LanguageId=1&ItemId=ce05a541-73ac-43f1-92f5-c346032bd57d,
[hereinafter Manitoba Labour Board]
9. News Release, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and
Industry (Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm.
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and abysmally low numbers among agricultural workers in
particular.10
Organizing guestworkers is just a first step.  Whether a union can
effectively monitor and enforce contract improvements or other le-
gal entitlements is still an open question.  To do this, guestworkers
need the same thing any other union member needs—an organiza-
tion that can fully engage and represent members, as well as use
organizing, education, bargaining, political action, legal advocacy,
coalition work, and other tools to promote members’ interests.
Each of the agricultural unions has explored some sort of work
in Mexico, where the overwhelming majority of North American
agricultural guestworkers live.  FLOC is the only union that has
built a program in Mexico to communicate with members, educate
workers about their rights, and confront abuses.  FLOC opened an
office in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2005, and FLOC organizers started
running outreach programs to educate workers in Mexico about
their rights.11  Soon after, FLOC began to receive threats.12  The
threats escalated in 2007 after FLOC began educating workers
about an agreement reached with an employer prohibiting
recruiters in Mexico from charging fees for visa applications, travel
costs, or other expenses.13  In the spring of 2007, Santiago Rafael
Cruz, a FLOC organizer recently assigned to Monterrey, was at-
tacked in the FLOC office and beaten to death by agents believed
to be associated with corrupt recruiters.14  If corrupt agents are
willing to assassinate an organizer whose death is bound to receive
attention, the likelihood that individual workers in remote towns
will be able to avoid exploitation without significant help appears
low.  FLOC’s work is a model of the importance of Mexico-based
work in order to stop abuses and protect gains.  Because of
10. E-mail from Marc Levesque, Statistics Canada, to Jennifer Hill (Nov. 26, 2005,
14:26:37 EST) (on file with author) (stating that agriculture industry unionization
rates are less than 1% in Canada).  The U.S. has slightly higher agriculture industry
unionization rates at 3.5%, as compared with an average 18-20% unionization rate for
workers overall. See News Release, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006 (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.bls.gov/news.re-
lease/union2.nr0.htm.
11. Dan La Botz, Farm Labor Organizer is Murdered in Mexico, LABOR NOTES,
http://labornotes.org/node/800 (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
12. Id.; see also Farm Labor Organizing Committee, Take Urgent Action:  Stop
Deportation of FLOC Organizer from Mexico (2005), quoted in E-mail from Allison
Fletcher Acosta, Jobs with Justice, to Jennifer Hill (Dec. 19, 2006 09:59:22 EST) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Take Urgent Action].
13. Elisabeth Malkin, Graft Mars the Recruitment of Mexican Guest Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2007, at A3.
14. Id.
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FLOC’s lack of status as a union in Mexico, however, some mecha-
nisms that might further the union’s goals are not available, and
these limits undermine the effort to provide full representation.
Part I briefly describes U.S. and Canadian guestworker pro-
grams and recent organizing campaigns.  Part II lays out the notion
of full representation, arguing that a program of Mexico-based
work is necessary to represent agricultural guestworkers fully;
moreover, union status under Mexican law is required to have ac-
cess to the entire range of activities and protections that would
make union work more effective.  Part II then reviews some of the
activities FLOC has carried out in Mexico as well as others that
might be relevant to the union’s success.  Finally, Part II describes
elements of the UFW and UFCW approaches that call for Mexico-
based work.
Part III discusses Mexico’s registration system.  Registering is
mandatory under Mexican law to function as a union in Mexico,
though the process is supposed to be a formality that does not pre-
vent legitimate unions from gaining legal status.  Mexican officials,
however, have been criticized for abusing the registration process
and denying the petitions of independent unions seeking to regis-
ter.15  In the case of guestworkers, there are two provisions of Mex-
ican law that are likely obstacles to registration: the requirement of
an employment relationship in Mexico and the bar on foreigners as
trade union officials.  Part III suggests that given the broad scope
of protective labor laws under Mexican law as a whole and the re-
quirement that ambiguities be interpreted in favor of workers,
neither provision should be applied so as to bar a guestworker
union from registering.
If the obstacles in current Mexican law were eliminated, the door
would be open for the creation of binational guestworker unions, a
new phenomenon.  While there already are international unions
that include members from both Canada and the United States,
these unions are formed when domestic workers in each country, in
effect, hold hands across the border.  In contrast, a binational
15. LANCE COMPA, JUSTICE FOR ALL:  THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN
MEXICO:  A REPORT BY THE SOLIDARITY CENTER 13, n.9 (2003), http://www.solidar-
itycenter.org/files/SolidarityMexicofinalpdf111703.pdf (citing U.S. . STATE DEP’T
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN PRACTICES (2002), stating the Mexican government
authorities “‘occasionally have withheld or delayed registration of unions’” and argu-
ing that “[t]his is an essential problem of freedom of association in Mexico:  authori-
ties’ favoritism toward unions friendly to government policies and influential
employers, and authorities’ reprisals against independent unions that challenge gov-
ernment policies, influential employers, and pro-government, pro-employer unions.”).
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guestworker union presents the image of one transnational worker
straddling the border with a foot on each side.  The image of a
binational guestworker union presents challenges to the primarily
domestic nature of labor law, but also allows for imagining a way to
bring immigrant workers fully into the house of labor.16
I. GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS AND VICTORIES
A. Historical Context: The “Perfect Immigrant”
Guestworker programs have been called a “distinctively modern
form of transnational migration.”17  It is possible to trace the evolu-
tion of guestworker programs from the early Polish agricultural
workers in 19th century Prussia, to South African diamond miners
brought in first from what is now Mozambique and later other ar-
eas, to domestic workers from the Philippines working throughout
Asia and the Middle East, and finally to the North American agri-
cultural guestworker programs.18  All of these temporary labor
programs were:
compromises designed to maintain high levels of migration
while placating anti-immigrant movements. They offered em-
ployers foreign workers who could still be bound like inden-
tured servants but who could also be disciplined by the threat of
deportation. They placated trade unionists who feared foreign
competition by promising to restrict guestworkers to the most
onerous work and to expel them during economic downturns.
And they assuaged nativists by isolating guestworkers from the
general population.  Finally, states got development aid from
poor countries in the form of ready workers, without the respon-
sibility of having to integrate those workers or provide for their
welfare.  The perfect immigrant was born.19
The Canadian Seasonal Agriculture Worker Program
(“CSAWP”) and the H-2A agricultural guestworker program in the
U.S. are modeled on this “perfect immigrant” theory.  The
16. Many scholars have examined the consequences of greater globalization for
national labor law regimes as well as the prospects for the development of stronger
international or regional systems of labor regulation. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Law
and Labor in the Global Economy:  Through the Lens of United States Federalism, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 445, 453-54 (1995); Lance Compa, International Labor
Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM.
U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 128-48 (1993); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor in the
Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 987 (1995).
17. Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants, supra note 4, at 71.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 73.
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guestworker cycle starts with recruitment, hiring, visa processing,
and travel in the home country.  This is followed by travel to—and
actual work in—the host country, and then a return to the home
country.20  When workers return, they carry with them the ongoing
effects of any abuse, injuries, or deprivations suffered in the host
country.  Since most guestworkers seek repeat engagements, rehir-
ing is also an important part of home country activity.  Most
guestworkers who work in the United States and Canada are from
Mexico,21 making Mexico the springboard for the current “perfect
immigrants.”
B. The Rules: Making Guestworkers Expensive
Many countries with guestworker programs attempt to establish
rules making guestworkers more expensive to employ than work-
ers already in the host country.  Both the Canadian and U.S. agri-
cultural guestworker programs include such rules.
The current agricultural guestworker program in the U.S. is the
H-2A program, a successor to the original H visa program estab-
lished in the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952,22 and
amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(“IRCA”).23  The IRCA reflects a balance between two policy
goals “to assure . . . employers [of low-skilled laborers] an ade-
quate labor force while at the same time protecting the jobs of U.S.
workers.”24  In order to authorize hiring of guestworkers, the De-
partment of Labor must certify that there is a shortage of U.S.
20. Some guestworkers do not return to their home countries, but overstay visas in
the host country, thus joining the ranks of undocumented agricultural workers. See
PHILIP L. MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION:  TEMPORARY WORKER PRO-
GRAMS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES
28 (2003), http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/bureau/inst/download/mi-
gration3.pdf (“Most migrants do return, but a small percentage of stayers among a
large number of migrants may still be ‘too many.’”); see also INT’L LABOUR OFFICE
(ILO), REPORT VI, TOWARDS A FAIR DEAL FOR MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY, 118 (2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/
---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/meetingdocument/kd00096.pdf (“The experience of
many countries is that ‘there is nothing more permanent than temporary workers’”).
21. See H-2A, H-2B Programs, supra note 7 (reporting 22,141 admissions in Fiscal
Year 2004 and 31,892 visas issued in Fiscal Year 2005, of which 89% were issued to
Mexican workers, and referring to U.S. government statistics).  Mexicans make up
about “55% of all the workers” in the Canadian CSAWP.  Pastor & Alva, supra note
5, at 98 n.13.
22. See Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants, supra note 4, at 70 n.4.
23. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2006).
24. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,
THE H-2A PROGRAM: PROTECTIONS FOR U.S. FARMWORKERS 12 (1988), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat16/137107.pdf.
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workers available and that there will be no adverse effect on U.S.
workers if guestworkers are employed.25  There is no numerical cap
on H-2A visas, and 31,774 H-2A visas were issued by the Depart-
ment of State in fiscal year (“FY”) 2004, a dramatic increase from
the 6445 in FY 1992 but still “quite small relative to total U.S. agri-
cultural employment, which stood at 3.2 million in 2002. . . .”26  H-
2A workers receive visas for seasonal work of up to one year, with
a maximum extension of up to three consecutive years.27
The H-2A statute includes provisions that seem to offer guaran-
tees better than any accorded domestic farmworkers, namely:
free transportation to and from the worksite, free housing dur-
ing employment, workers’ compensation insurance, a guarantee
of at least three-fourths of the total amount of work offered in
the job announcement, and payment at the highest of three min-
imum wages: (1) the federal or applicable state minimum wage;
(2) the local, job-specific “prevailing hourly wage;” or (3) the H-
2A “adverse effect wage” or AEWR.28
In Canada, the guestworker program is quite different in form—as
the product of bilateral negotiations—but contains similar provi-
sions to discourage the overuse of guestworkers.  CSAWP brings
roughly 19,000 workers per year to Canada to work temporarily for
agricultural employers under bilateral agreements with each send-
ing nation, among which is Mexico.29
25. See id. at 12-13; 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a); see also Mary Lee Hall, Defending the
Rights of H-2A Farmworkers, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 521, 524 (2002);
Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design:  How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest
Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 592 (2001).
26. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: IMMIGRATION:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS CRS-4 (2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P333.pdf.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(iv)(A); see also BRUNO, supra note 26, at CRS-2 (noting
that extended time periods are not readily approved by the CIS (formerly INS) or
DOL for H-2A and H-2B workers).
28. Holley, supra note 25, at 592.
29. See PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 3, at 7-8 (explaining
workers are authorized to enter “under section 10(c) of the Immigration Act and the
Immigration Regulations, 1978 . . . .  Section 20 of the Regulations permits the entry
into Canada of foreign workers in accordance with international agreements between
Canada and one or more foreign country” and citing Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States Concerning the Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program, 1974.). See
generally THE NORTH-SOUTH INSTITUTE, MIGRANT WORKERS IN CANADA:  A RE-
VIEW OF THE CANADIAN SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PROGRAM, (2006)
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/MigrantWorkers_Eng_Web.pdf [hereinafter MI-
GRANT WORKERS] .
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The first CSAWP agreements were concluded in the 1960s with
Caribbean countries, and Mexico began sending workers in 1974.30
Roughly 85% of the guestworkers travel to Ontario, and most
work cultivating and harvesting “apples, tomatoes, tobacco, cu-
cumbers, peaches, cherries, ginseng, and greenhouse tomatoes and
cucumbers.”31  The maximum stay is eight months, with an average
of 17-20 weeks.32  Under Canadian law, employers must pay for
travel to the farm from the point of arrival of the guestworkers in
Canada and must provide housing along with either meals or cook-
ing facilities, all without charge.33  Workers are guaranteed a mini-
mum of 240 hours of work for six weeks at the prevailing wage
rate.34  Employers are required to make sure workers are covered
under the provincial health plan and workplace safety insurance
plan.35
C. The Facts: “Close to Slavery”
Despite statutory guarantees, H-2A workers do hard work under
difficult conditions that rarely, if ever, rise to the level proscribed
by law.  Instead, guestworkers
are systematically exploited and abused . . . .  Bound to a single
employer and without access to legal resources, guestworkers
are routinely cheated out of wages; forced to mortgage their fu-
tures to obtain low-wage, temporary jobs; held virtually captive
by employers or labor brokers who seize their documents;
forced to live in squalid conditions; and, denied medical benefits
for on-the-job injuries.  House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Charles Rangel recently put it this way: “‘This
guestworker program’s the closest thing I’ve ever seen to
slavery.’”36
Workers are isolated in remote farms and migrant camps.  They
work long hours for wages well below the prescribed adverse effect
wage rate, doing dangerous work;37 H-2A workers are not eligible
30. MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 29, at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 4, 17.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id.
36. MARY BAUER, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, CLOSE TO SLAVERY:
GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2007), http://www.splcenter.
org/pdf/static/SPLCguestworker.pdf.
37. Lisa Guerra, Modern-Day Servitude: A Look at the H-2A Program’s Purposes,
Regulations, and Realities, 29 VT. L. REV. 185, 187 (2004).  The article outlines condi-
tions for all farmworkers as follows:
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for safety net programs, can be terminated at will, and have no
rights to be rehired in subsequent seasons.38  U.S. guestworkers
have some options for enforcement of substantive rights in state
and federal court, as well as through regulatory agencies, but such
options have proven ineffective.39  H-2A workers may be repre-
sented by legal services lawyers, though these lawyers have been
barred from helping clients during the contracting stage of the
work cycle in Mexico.40  H-2A workers do not have any method of
“earned” legalization under U.S. immigration law, and are barred
from admission as a guestworker if they plan to seek to become a
lawful permanent resident.41  Moreover, H-2A workers are ex-
cluded from the National Labor Relations Act,42 and, ironically,
also excluded from the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Work-
ers’ Protection Act.43
The median income for farmworkers ranges from $2500 to $7500 annually.
Contrary to popular belief, very few farmworkers use, or are even eligible
for, public social services such as Medicare, food stamps, or the Women,
Infants, and Children Supplemental Nutrition Program (WIC).  Farm work
is one of the most dangerous industries in the United States.  Thus, Mexican
farmworkers ‘suffer from the highest rates of toxic chemical injuries of any
workers in the [United States].’  Farmworkers also suffer higher rates of heat
stress, dermatitis, influenza, pneumonia, urinary tract infections, pesticide-
related illness, and tuberculosis.
Id.
38. See Hall, supra note 25, at 523 (describing the exclusion of H-2A workers from
safety net programs); LANCE COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVAN-
TAGE:  WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 208, 221 (2000), http://hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/
us/uslbr008.pdf (explaining the implications of H-2A’s workers’ at-will status and
describing H-2A’s workers’ fear of being blacklisted).
39. See Hall, supra note 25, at 614-15.
40. Id. at 614 (“LSC regulations have been interpreted as prohibiting LSC-pro-
grams from conducting outreach in other countries, and thus H-2A workers are effec-
tively denied the opportunity to make their complaints from the safety of their own
communities. Rather, in order for an H-2A worker to gain representation, he usually
needs to contact the legal aid program while working in the United States—that is,
while housed at the grower’s labor camp or during the brief transit period back to
Mexico.”).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006) (providing that a worker must have “a
residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning . . . .”).
42. “The term ‘employee’ . . .  shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer . . . .” See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(2006).  Of course, given the stringent restrictions on secondary activities under the
Act, which likely would have constrained the UFW and FLOC in their boycott activi-
ties, continued exclusion may have been a blessing in disguise.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1802 (8)(B)(ii) (2006) (“The term ‘migrant agricultural worker’
does not include . . . (ii) any temporary nonimmigrant alien who is authorized to work
in agricultural employment in the United States under sections 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)
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Reports of abuses under the Canadian guestworker program are
not as widespread as under the U.S. guestworker programs, but
problems such as pesticide use, unsafe housing, mistreatment, fail-
ures to pay promised wages or meet other contractual guarantees,
inadequate medical attention and/or fear of reporting ailments, in-
consistent rules and regulations, and discrimination all have been
reported as taking place in the Canadian program.44  In addition,
guestworkers must pay for a significant portion of their airfare to
Canada, the entire cost of a work permit, and contributions to the
Employment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan, money most will
never again see.45
According to the bilateral agreement, the Mexican State Em-
ployment Service, under the Ministry of Labor, recruits workers,
and Mexican consular officers “have the mandate to supervise the
employers in order to ensure that they respect the rights and well-
being of the workers as well as to help them at all times.”46  The
employer has the right to send a worker home before the end of
the contract term, but the consular officer is supposed to try to
transfer the worker to another employer before acceding to depor-
tation.47  The consular officers suffer from mixed messages, how-
ever, as one institute has pointed out that,
[o]n the one hand, they [the consular officers] are designated as
the workers’ representatives for the purposes of the Employ-
ment Agreements. On the other hand, the CSAWP Operational
Guidelines state that the agents’ duty is to help ‘“ensure the
smooth functioning of the program for the mutual benefit of
both the employers and the workers.’”  This requires the agents
and 1184(c) . . . .”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 10(B)(iii) (2006) (excluding H-2A workers
also from the definition of “seasonal agricultural worker.”).
44. See MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 29, at 10, 12 (noting, for example, that
there were “high rates of reported sickness or injury among migrants, affecting one in
three workers from . . .  Mexico, . . .” and “one-quarter of Mexican workers reported
that their employers had mistreated them on occasion . . . .”).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Mexican Consular Office in Montreal, Canada, Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Program, http://www.consulmex.qc.ca/versionenglish/ptat.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2008). For general information about the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program, see
Service Canada, Government of Canada, Agricultural Programs and Services: Over-
view, http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/on/epb/agri/overview.shtml (last visited Jan.
20, 2008). See also DR. KERRY PREIBISCH, CANADA’S SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS PROGRAM AS A MODEL OF BEST PRACTICES IN MIGRANT WORKER PAR-
TICIPATION IN THE BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION PROJECT, SOCIAL RELA-
TIONS PRACTICES BETWEEN SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, THEIR
EMPLOYERS, AND THE RESIDENTS OF RURAL ONTARIO (2004), http://www.nsi-ins.ca/
english/pdf/exec_sum_preibisch.pdf.
47. See MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 29, at 17.
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to act as ‘mediators’ or ‘neutral arbiters’ in worker-employee
disputes in conflict with their role as worker representatives.48
“The lack of representation afforded to workers” is “the funda-
mental flaw” in Canada’s guestworker program.49  Critics claim
that consular officers make poor representatives in Canada be-
cause of an inherent conflict of interest, as consular officers are
reluctant “to be too strict with employers for fear of losing labour
placements to another labour source country.”50  Consular officers
are both promoters of Mexican labor and protectors of Mexican
laborers, a dual role that can create conflicts if the attractiveness of
Mexico as a source country is in part dependent on the willingness
of Mexican workers to accept conditions and treatment that is less
than what the program guarantees.
D. Organizing Victories
Against this backdrop, the recent organizing campaigns stand
out, offering the possibility of improving conditions for an ex-
ploited workforce.  Each of the campaigns is distinct, based on an
analysis of worker interest, employer vulnerability, legal options,
and other factors.  The approaches to organizing and bargaining
foreshadow, to some extent, the role that Mexico-based work sub-
sequently plays in union efforts.
1. The FLOC Campaign
In September 2004, FLOC won an agreement to represent the
8500 H-2A guestworkers employed by the North Carolina Growers
Association (“NCGA”).51  The win capped a five and a half-year
campaign.52  The NCGA, a farm labor contractor providing work-
48. Id. at 12.
49. UFCW CANADA, NAT’L REPORT ON THE STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM WORK-
ERS IN CANADA 8 (2005) [hereinafter UFCW 2005], available at http://www.ufcw.ca/
Theme/UFCW/files/PDF2006/UFCW5thMigrantWorkersReport2005.pdf; see also
UFCW CANADA, NAT’L REPORT ON THE STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM WORKERS IN
CANADA (2004) [hereinafter UFCW 2004], available at http://www.ufcw.ca/Theme/
UFCW/files/AgWorkersReport2004ENG.pdf.
50. PREIBISCH, supra note 46, at 5.
51. Greenhouse, Growers’ Group, supra note 7; McKinnon, supra note 7.
52. David Griffith, Challenges to Farmworker Organizing in the South:  From the
Southern Tenant Farmers Union to the Farm Labor Organizing Committee’s Mt. Olive
Campaign, 26 CULTURE & AGRIC. 25, 34 (2004) (arguing the FLOC campaign was
“innovative for at least three reasons:  1.  It unites workers based on their production
of a specific processed commodity rather than a specific grower, firm, or industry.  2.
It targets integrators, who contract with growers, rather than farms.  3.  It is transna-
tional, which allows or encourages linkages between productive and reproductive la-
bor.”); see also COMPA, supra note 38, at 210-11(describing FLOC’s North Carolina
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ers to more than 1000 growers, was the formal employer of the
guestworkers and signed the contract, but the deal was reached be-
cause FLOC targeted the Mt. Olive Pickle Company, the principal
“integrator,” with a consumer boycott.53  After Mt. Olive agreed to
pay more for the cucumbers it bought, the NCGA agreed to pass
on increases to workers and sign a union contract.54  The agree-
ment was the first signed by agricultural employers in North Caro-
lina and includes another first, as well: “the contract provides for a
union hiring hall in Mexico to help supply guest workers.”55
2. The UFW Campaign
In April 2006, the UFW announced an agreement with Global
Horizons, a farm labor contractor employing one to three thousand
guestworkers in up to a dozen states.56  Global Horizons “signed
the union contract in part to help improve its image after Washing-
ton State revoked its license to do business there because of viola-
tions alleged by state investigators.”57  The contract included
provisions guaranteeing protection from retaliation, firing only for
just cause, a two percent raise in wages above the wage required
under H-2A rules, paid medical care and workers’ compensation
coverage, paid work breaks, seniority protections for hiring and
layoffs, a death benefit, burial insurance, and bereavement leave
campaign as building on its earlier “landmark” campaign against the Campbell’s
corporation).
53. Griffith, supra note 52, at 34.
[T]he targeting of the integrator—in this case, the pickle processor, which
integrates the harvesting and processing of cucumbers—is innovative be-
cause, as noted earlier, subcontracting arrangements are becoming more
common throughout the economy and integrators, as the designation im-
plies, integrate several different and different kinds of producers into one
production process. Subcontracting relations, which bind cucumber farmers
to the pickle companies through seasonal production contracts, while bene-
fiting integrators, often make it difficult for contract workers to voice their
opinions about production processes because they risk having their contracts
canceled at the end of their current contract period.
54. Id. See McKinnon, supra note 7.
55. Greenhouse, Growers’ Group, supra note 7; see also Lisa Marie Gomez, Fol-
lowing Footsteps of Cesar Chavez, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 7, 2006, at 1A;
Jerry Hirsch, Farm Labor Contractor, Union in Pact:  The Agreement Between Global
Horizons and the UFW Offers Benefits for Guest Workers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2006,
at C2.
56. See Greenhouse, Farmworkers’ Union, supra note 7; Nyhan, supra note 7;
Sirocchi, supra note 7 .
57. Greenhouse, Farmworkers’ Union, supra note 7.
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including paid travel to their country of origin.58  Also under the
contract, “Global promised to recruit in Mexico before
Thailand.”59
3. The UFCW Campaign
In Canada, the UFCW established Migrant Agricultural Worker
Support Centres in the early 1990s to assist migrants with legal sup-
port, training, and advocacy.60  In September 2006, the union won
union elections at one farm in Manitoba and three farms in Que-
bec.61  These were the first guestworker units to organize in Ca-
nada, and the employer in Manitoba challenged the certification,
claiming that the Manitoba Labour Relations Act (“MLRA”) did
not cover seasonal workers.62  In June 2007, the Manitoba Labour
Board decided in favor of the workers, ruling that migrant workers
were covered under the MLRA.63  Certification applications for
the Quebec units still were pending as of June 2007.64  The UFCW
has not been able to organize in Ontario—where the overwhelm-
ing majority of the roughly 18,000 agricultural guestworkers in Ca-
nada work—and guestworkers are still “banned from joining a
union under provincial legislation.”65
58. United Farm Workers, Global Horizons-UFW Contract Summary, http://www.
ufw.org/_page.php?menu=organizing&inc=keycampaign/globalhorizons/GHcontract.
htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
59. H-2A, H-2B Programs, supra note 7.  Another encouraging sign, at least for
farmworkers organizing in California, was the 2002 passage of a mandatory mediation
law:
The law requires mediation to reach a contract between grower and union
after workers vote to be represented by a union.  Previously, growers could
use a variety of tactics to prolong the contract process indefinitely . . .  The
first payoff came in February, when the UFW signed a contract with Pict-
sweet Mushrooms in Ventura—17 years after employees there voted for
UFW representation.  As a result, Lorenz [James Lorenz, an Oakland attor-
ney who co-founded California Rural Legal Assistance with Chavez] be-
lieves the union’s prospects are bright . . .  ‘Right now they’re positioned
better than they were since about 1982,’ he said.
UFW’s New Path:  Help Millions, 11 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS (2004), available at
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=854_0_8_0.
60. UFCW 2005, supra note 49, at 1.
61. See Man., Que. Migrant Workers, supra note 8.
62. See Manitoba Labour Board, supra note 8.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Man., Que. Migrant Workers, supra note 8.  The Agricultural Employees Pro-
tection Act of Ontario gives agricultural workers the right of freedom of association,
but the union says that the lack of “enabling legislation providing a legal framework
for collective bargaining” means that workers do not, in fact, have the “legislative
right to form or join a trade union.”  UFCW 2004, supra note 49, at 22; see also World
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Nevertheless, the union called its victory a “historical break-
through”66 and remains committed to organizing farmworkers.
Moreover, the UFCW has recommended that the government of
Canada “make it a condition of the CSAWP that migrant farm
workers belong to a union and acknowledge UFCW Canada as the
union representative for migrant farm workers in Canada and . . .
provide funding to run the Migrant Agricultural Worker Support
Centres on their behalf.”67
II. FULL REPRESENTATION OF TRANSNATIONAL WORKERS
A. Full Representation I: Transnational Work Cycles,
Problems, and Lives
Agricultural guestworkers live a transnational life, “cyclically-so-
journing” from Mexico to the U.S. or Canada, and back again.68
Because poor workers in Mexico are desperate for employment,
many seek to be rehired year after year.  Thus, the cycle is a repeat-
ing one.
Briefs, 13 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS (2007), available at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
rmn/more.php?id=1184_0_4_0 (noting that “[f]our mushroom pickers with over five
years experience were fired in . . . Ontario after they signed cards authorizing the
United Food and Commercial Workers to represent them. . . .  Under Ontario’s 2003
Agriculture Employees Protection Act, farm employers do not have to bargain with
farm worker unions.”).
66. Man., Que. Migrant Workers, supra note 8.
67. UFCW 2005, supra note 49, at 4.  It is not unprecedented that a union should
play a formal representative role within a guestworker program.  Temporary nonim-
migrant workers seeking entry to the United States under the O or P visa categories,
for example, must include copies of advisory opinions from “peer groups,” specifically
including labor unions, when they apply for their visa.  Those opinions are considered
in the determination of whether the applicant has the required extraordinary ability.
See Amy E. Worden, Gaining Entry:  The New O and P Categories For Nonimmigrant
Alien Athletes, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 467, 479-80 (1999).  The fact that these unions
have tended to play a gatekeeper role, not an organizing role, does not mean that
farmworker unions could not develop a different strategy. More generally, “union-
supervised migration”—taking the form of a “union-organized underground railroad”
moving workers from southern to northern jobs during World War II years—is an
interesting option that served members of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, allied
unions, and even employers and government farm labor agencies well. See
HAHAMOVITCH, FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR, supra note 4, at 182-99.
68. See Fran Ansley, Mexican Guestworkers in Carolina del Norte: Social Move-
ment Lawyering on Transnational Ground 4 (unpublished paper, on file with author)
(detailing accounts of changing communities among workers who may be “linearly-
immigrating” or “cyclically-sojourning”). See generally LEON FINK, THE MAYA OF
MORGANTON:  WORK AND COMMUNITY IN THE NUEVO NEW SOUTH (Univ. of N.C.
Press 2003); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
503 (2007); David Bacon, Transnational Communities Redefine Citizenship for a
Globalized World (2005), http://dbacon.igc.org/Imgrants/2005transnational.html .
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To fully represent guestworkers, a union must be present
throughout the work cycle. Although unions often are not involved
at the hiring stage, there are two ways in which unions get in-
volved, both of which are applicable to the guestworker cycle.
First, where gross abuses such as discrimination, harassment, extor-
tion, or coercion occur during hiring or where union members face
discrimination in rehiring, unions have grounds for taking action.
In addition, where a union seeks to act as a hiring hall, the union
becomes central to managing the process of hiring and rehiring.
In Mexico, workers are hired by recruiters who may harass, dis-
criminate, or retaliate, as well as use coercion to extort exorbitant
fees.69  Stopping those abuses is not easy.  One might wish that it
were as simple as negotiating an agreement with the employer in
the host country stating that the employer will end its contract with
any recruiter shown to commit abuses.  Yet finding proof of re-
cruiter abuses is difficult as workers are scared of retaliation
against themselves or family members if they speak out, even if
they know to whom to speak.  Thus a witness to corroborate such
abusive behavior is not likely to be found.  Even harder may be
identifying a “clean” contractor, one that can be identified as will-
ing to commit to respecting worker rights and effectively moni-
tored to ensure continued compliance.70
Several individual Mexican states are serving as recruiters for
guestworkers as part of a pilot national program in which some
states are participating.71  Some activists hope that an increased
69. See Holley, supra note 25, at 596 (citing Jen McCaffery, Virginia’s Migrants
Easily Exploited, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at A1, and Esther Schrader, Widen-
ing the Field of Workers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at A1); see also BAUER, supra
note 36, at 9 (describing the indebtedness of guestworkers recruited in a similar fash-
ion for the H-2B program); infra text accompanying notes 86-90 for a discussion of
FLOC’s efforts to stop recruiters from charging fees and the subsequent violent
backlash.
70. Unions, as well as other groups, often use a strategy that involves convincing a
decision-maker to contract for services or goods from a supplier willing to abide by
certain standards. See, e.g., Worker Rights Consortium, Designated Supplier Pro-
gram—Revised (2006), http://www.workersrights.org/DSP/Designated%20Suppliers
%20Program%20-%20Revised.pdf (outlining a project to identify sources for univer-
sity gear that comply with applicable labor standards, to win agreements whereby
universities agree to use such “clean” sources, and to monitor implementation of the
agreements).  To make such agreements meaningful, there has to be both companies
that can be put on the list as “clean” contractors and a mechanism for effective moni-
toring to ensure continued compliance.  In the guestworker context, there is no clear
“clean” option, nor is there a well-developed monitoring system.
71. E-mail from Rachel Micah-Jones, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, to Jen-
nifer Hill (Nov. 26, 2007, 16:46:45  PDT) (on file with author) [hereinafter Micah-
Jones Email 1].
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state role in recruiting could “break the chain of trafficking”72  that
characterizes guestworker hiring now, but there is little evidence to
suggest that the Mexican state will be highly effective in ending
corruption.  Investigating recruiter violations during the hiring and
rehiring stages of the guestworker cycle, as well as creating mecha-
nisms to either correct problems or end the employer’s relationship
with an abusive recruiter, are key aspects of full representation.
These are not the only elements, however.  Reaching workers in
their hometowns in Mexico offers an opportunity to communicate
away from employer surveillance and outside of the intense work
schedules that generally characterize guestworkers’ host country
time.  Workers who are fired or suffer lasting injuries generally can
only be reached in Mexico.  If a union is to educate guestworkers
about their rights, train leaders to enforce guestworker contracts,
and investigate problems left over after a host country visit by a
guestworker, Mexico is the only place to do so.  In addition, there
is the chance to talk with workers after hiring but before they em-
bark on their travels if they can be reached while in Monterrey for
visa processing.  For all these reasons, what happens in Mexico is
an important part of the work cycle to be scrutinized by the union.
There also is a broader community-building function of Mexico-
based work.  At their best, unions provide an opportunity for peo-
ple of different races, classes, and genders—people who cross all
sorts of boundaries—to struggle together for a common goal.  Un-
ions provide for a chance to learn, to help others, to take on leader-
ship roles, to enjoy fellowship, and otherwise to build a union
community.  Guestworker unions doing work in Mexico might be
considered to be engaged in the project of building a “transna-
tional community” that ties together guestworkers, their home
country communities, and other union members in the host
country.73
Guestworker unions, in this aspect, are part of “an upsurge in
hometown associations, cross-border indigenous groups, and other
[groups] that suggest a growing identification [among Mexicans] as
72. Id. (citing Rodolfo Cordova, Centro de Alternativas para el Desarrollo Social,
AC.).
73. See Griffith, supra note 52, at 33-35. For more on transnational community-
building, particularly hometown associations and political activism, see also David
Fitzgerald, State and Emigration:  A Century of Emigration Policy in Mexico 2-3 (Ctr.
for Comparative Immigration Studies, Univ. of Cal. San Diego, Working Paper No.
123, 2005), available at http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg123.pdf; Pas-
tor & Alva, supra note 5.
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trans or bi-nationals.”74  Immigrant rights advocates building
“transnational communities” fought, for example, to win the right
of Mexicans abroad to vote in the last Mexican elections.75  In a
similar vein, guestworker union leaders recognize “that permanent
residence might not be the goal of some immigrant workers and
that creating easier mechanisms for such transnational existence
might therefore be important.”76
B. Full Representation II: Worker Interests and Union Tools
If the first axis of full representation is to be active throughout
the work cycle, the second axis is extending the union’s reach to
include all possible tools available for promoting workers’
interests.
Stopping abuses in recruitment will require all the tools the
union can muster, as well as innovative experiments in legal advo-
cacy, direct action, and policy efforts.  Some experiments are un-
derway, including exploration of the use of articles 25 and 28 of the
Mexican Ley Federal del Trabajo [Federal Labor Law].  Both arti-
cles 25 and 28 of the Mexican Federal Labor Law cover Mexican
citizens recruited in Mexico to work outside the country, and arti-
cle 28 states that employers must pay for transportation and food,
as well as ensure that workers receive their full salaries, are cov-
ered by workers’ compensation protections, and have adequate
housing.77  Employers must post a bond with the Mexican authori-
74. Pastor & Alva, supra note 5, at 93.
75. See, e.g., Anna Fink, Voting from El Norte:  Political Participation and Trans-
national Citizenship Across the U.S.-Mexico Border 26 (May 2006) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Tex. at Austin) (on file with author) (arguing that Mexican
immigrant “Hometown Associations” advocated for the right to vote in Mexican elec-
tions from abroad and “played a key role in the movement and final passage of the
absentee voting bill in June of 2005”); see also David Bacon, Cross-Border Organiz-
ing, Z MAGAZINE ONLINE, Dec. 2002, http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Dec2002/baconprint
1202.htm (describing the efforts of the Binational Indigenous Oaxacan Front to pro-
mote participation in Mexican politics by members in both the U.S. and Mexico).
76. Pastor & Alva, supra note 5, at 94.
77. Victoria Gavito, The Pursuit of Justice is Without Borders:  Binational Strate-
gies for Defending Migrants’ Rights, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5 (2007).  The article pro-
vides a translation of article 28 as follows:
The expenses for transportation . . . and food for the worker and his family
. . . .  shall be to the exclusive charge of the employer.  The worker shall
receive his entire corresponding salary, without any discounts for any
amount related with the referred items . . . .  The worker shall have the right
to the benefits given by the welfare institutions to foreign citizens in the
country where they will render their services.  In all cases they shall have to
right to indemnity for work related risks . . . .  They shall have the right to
decent and clean housing at the place of work or nearby location . . .  For all
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ties to guarantee the fulfillment of these obligations78 as well as
provide a written contract to workers and pay visa costs.79
Recruiters, as well as employers, are required to comply with the
terms of article 28.80  Although the law is a virtual dead letter,
there are experiments underway trying to breathe life into this law
and a related provision in the Ley General de Poblacion [General
Population Law].81
Researching the relationships among recruiters and employers
and the geography of recruitment for particular employers is im-
portant.  Unions need to know whether the employer is evading
the contract, and identify what competitors are doing in order to
expand organizing efforts.  Organizing new guestworker units
builds union numbers and thus power, contributes to raising stan-
dards more generally to prevent undercutting competition, and cre-
ates momentum that can lead to future victories.  Because
guestworker organizing so far has relied on identifying and pressur-
ing employers vulnerable because of past abuses, the research on
Mexican sources and abuses is particularly important.  Ideally,
guestworker unions would be able to create enough pressure so
that eventually a “clean” recruiting option would emerge; this
could take the form of a bargained agreement with recruiters to
follow a particular code, the development of the union as a hiring
hall itself, or an agreement with state or private recruiters allowing
for monitoring.
Workers’ interests may be broader than the workers’ problems
outlined in the previous Section. Workers have an interest, for ex-
ample, in ensuring that their jobs continue to exist.  For
guestworkers, that means union involvement in immigration policy
debates, among other things. Guestworkers have a limited impact
on U.S. or Canadian policy, but could have a greater impact on
Mexican policy debates or renegotiation of the Mexico-Canada bi-
lateral guestworker agreement.  Mexican guestworkers also have
legal effects, the employer shall designate his domicile as being inside the
Republic . . . .
Id.  The original, Spanish text of article 28 is available at http://www.diputados.gob.
mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/125.pdf.
78. Watts, supra note 1, at 27.
79. E-mail from Rachel Micah-Jones, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, to Jen-
nifer Hill (July 28, 2006, 11:32:19 PDT) (on file with author) (citing and explaining
various aspects of article 28, Ley Federal De Trabajo [Federal Labor Law]) [her-
inafter Micah-Jones Email 2].
80. Id.
81. Id.
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an interest in lobbying for the time they work abroad to be used in
calculating social benefits.
Direct action, research, organizing, bargaining, innovative legal
strategies, and political action all may be important to achieving
full representation of guestworkers.  For some of these activities, it
would not be enough to just do work in Mexico; the union also
would need to have legal status as a union.  For example, unions
that operate simply as nonprofits, rather than unions, do not have
access to Juntas de Conciliacion y Arbitraje (“JCA”), the labor
tribunals, to seek protection under labor laws.  Though the JCAs
often are criticized, they provide a forum and a set of legal provi-
sions that can be used to protest abuses.  Guestworker unions are
not part of any Mexican federation or confederation of trade un-
ions, and guestworker unions cannot participate in tripartite social
dialogue on issues such as immigration policy or employment bene-
fits without status.  Filing charges as the representative of the
worker usually requires formal status, and bringing claims to vari-
ous international labor rights forums requires recognition as a do-
mestic union.  For example, a guestworker union likely could file
claims under the labor side agreement to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) or through the International La-
bour Organization based on its status as a Mexican union. There is
no one tool that allows guestworker unions to radically transform
the industry and stop abuses, but each tool adds significantly to the
arsenal and helps protect workers’ interests.
The bottom line is that restriction of a guestworker union’s abil-
ity to be involved with members’ lives throughout the work cycle,
and to take action to defend members’ work interests should not
be permitted absent a significant justification.
C. FLOC’s Program
FLOC’s experience so far demonstrates the importance of Mex-
ico-based work.  FLOC has focused on grievance investigations,
rights education, monitoring recruiters in a limited fashion, and re-
sponding to threats or attacks against its organizers.  Such work is
vital but ultimately represents only the first steps in exploring
cross-border union work.  To develop a stronger program, legal
union status would be helpful.  In particular, union status would
enable FLOC to represent workers before domestic and interna-
tional labor bodies, file claims representing its members, partici-
pate in tripartite social dialogue and political actions related to
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immigration or other relevant policies, and perhaps gain greater
protection against harassment, at least from official sources.
1. Early Outreach
FLOC won improvements in its initial collective bargaining
agreement with the NCGA, including modest raises and the crea-
tion of a grievance process for resolving problems.82  By 2006, over
4000 grievances had been filed.83  Resolving those grievances, in
some cases, required investigative work in Mexico involving work-
ers injured on the job, fired, or at home during the off-season.84
Educating workers about their rights generated a backlash from
those who benefit from workers’ lack of knowledge.  One FLOC
organizer was threatened with deportation in 2005, after being “de-
tained seven times by local, state, and federal Mexican police for
simply conducting meetings in villages educating workers about
their rights . . . .”85
2. Responding to Violence
In 2007, as part of the settlement of an earlier FLOC lawsuit, the
NCGA agreed that the employer, not workers, would pay all
recruiting fees for two years.86  FLOC’s activities in Monterrey in-
cluded monitoring Manpower of the Americas, the recruiting
agency used by NCGA.87  Union staff contacted workers to explain
the terms of the settlement and prevent recruiters from continuing
to collect fees.88  This, reported Baldemar Velasquez, president of
FLOC, “took away a gold mine” from recruiters.89  Corrupt
recruiters, perhaps in association with corrupt authorities, retali-
ated by breaking into FLOC offices, threatening organizers, and
finally murdering Santiago Rafael Cruz.90
Velasquez does not blame the recruiting agency or the NCGA
for the murder, although presumably, it was someone linked to one
of their agents who was responsible.  The president of Manpower
82. See McKinnon, supra note 7.
83. See Stephen Franklin, Sides Find Scarce Common Ground, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
11, 2007, at 11.
84. See Take Urgent Action, supra note 12; Franco Ordonez, Union Wrestles with
Uncertainty, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 7, 2006.
85. Take Urgent Action, supra note 12.
86. See Malkin, supra note 13.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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of the Americas has stated that “his company kept a tight rein on
his local recruiters,” but in a system where corruption is pervasive,
top-down control may not be enough.91  FLOC can complain of
recruitment violations to NCGA, but bargaining in the U.S. has not
yet resulted in transparency or fairness in Mexico-based recruiting.
Two Mexican human rights groups, el Centro de Derechos Huma-
nos de la Montana Tlachinollan and the Project of Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (“ProDesc”) filed a petition protesting the
assassination of Cruz and the failure of the government to ade-
quately investigate Cruz’s murder with the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights.92  The Commission asked the Mexican
government to take precautionary measures to ensure that FLOC
organizers and leaders were safeguarded while in the country, in-
cluding urging the government to move the investigation forward,
installing closed-circuit security cameras in the FLOC office in
Monterrey, and providing satellite phones to organizers so they
could maintain contact from outlying areas.93  Although it is impor-
tant that labor rights violations get attention in human rights fora,
what is currently missing is FLOC’s ability to press its own claims
in labor tribunals.94
3. Organizing
Organizing is central to promoting the interests of members.  Ul-
timately, the goal is to organize enough workers to “take wages out
of competition,” but lacking that, unions may target immediate
competitors that violate workers’ rights to employ low-cost labor.95
For agricultural guestworkers, the competition might consist of
lower-cost undocumented workers or non-union guestworker prov-
iders.96  The “NCGA is losing customers, as farmers complain
91. Id.
92. See Micah-Jones Email 1, supra note 71; see also Letter, Solicitud de Medidas
Cautelares, Proyecto de Derechos Economicos, Sociales, y Culturales, ProDESC
(2007) [hereinafter Prodesc Letter] (on file with author).
93. See Prodesc Letter, supra note 92.
94. Of course, FLOC and other agricultural worker unions have a limited ability
to gain such protections in the U.S., given the exclusion of agricultural workers from
coverage under the National Labor Relations Act.
95. Ordonez, supra note 84.  On the more general point, see Paul F. Clark et al.,
Private-Sector Collective Bargaining:  Is This the End or a New Beginning?, in COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 2002) (“Un-
ions were successful in the past, in part, because they were able to ‘take wages out of
competition.’”).
96. See Eduardo Porter, Who Will Work the Farms?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at
C1; see also MARTIN, supra note 20, at 30 (explaining more generally the “numbers
versus rights” dilemma as follows: “If all migrants are legal, and they receive the same
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about increased costs of obtaining H-2A workers, about $950 a
worker, up from the previous $500.”97  Baldemar Velasquez, presi-
dent of FLOC, gave a characteristically optimistic understatement
when noting that “challenging times are ahead.”98
Farmworker employers want to have access to both undocu-
mented workers already here and to increased numbers of
guestworkers; high unemployment in Mexico means workers will
continue to travel north looking for work, although guestworkers
may become more desirable to many employers because of tighter
immigration restrictions.99  There is evidence that an increase in
the use of guestworkers is beginning; in Florida, for example, there
was an estimated 500% increase in the use of guestworkers in
2006.100
This creates an opportunity for unions to expand their toehold in
the industry.  In Mexico, FLOC could learn which U.S. employers
are recruiting guestworkers, from what regions, and how to contact
workers prior to their journey north.  FLOC might be able to direct
work to certain recruiters, creating pressure to bring recruiters to
the bargaining table.  Union registration is particularly key to this
strategy:
Without registration, unions can still hold meetings, elect of-
ficers, make demands on employers, issue public statements and
the like, in keeping with the principle of freedom of association.
However, other parties need not respond to their actions since
unregistered unions are treated as lacking the required legal
capacity.101
A union with legal status could seek to get involved with tripar-
tite social dialogue—open only to unions, employers, and govern-
ment officials—on immigration policy; by advocating for a more
just immigration policy in Mexico as well as in the U.S., a
benefits as local workers, employers are likely to request fewer, posing a numbers
versus rights dilemma.”).  Some argue that employers falsely claim a shortage in order
to increase political will to step up guestworker limits but forestall efforts toward
greater enforcement of minimum standards. See David Bacon, Farmworkers’ Plight:
No Fruits for Their Labor, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 11, 2006, at B-9.
97. H-2A, H-2B Programs, supra note 7.
98. Ordonez, supra note 84.
99. Gavito, supra note 77.
100. Id.  Note that this includes all types of guestworkers, not just agricultural
guestworkers.
101. HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT-GOVERNMENT OF CANADA,
REVIEW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CAN 2003-1:  REPORT ISSUED PURSUANT TO
THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION 4-4 (2005), http://
www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/spila/ialc/pcnaalc/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter CAN 2003-1].
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guestworker union might be better positioned to increase protec-
tions for workers and also opportunities for organizing.  This strat-
egy might be even more useful to the UFCW, were it to expand
operations in Mexico, because the guestworker program is negoti-
ated bilaterally.
III. OBSTACLES TO REGISTRATION IN MEXICO
A. General Principles and the Registration Requirement
The right to freedom of association is well-protected, at least in
principle, under Mexican law.  The Mexican Constitution itself
“provides workers the right to freely associate, to organize unions,
and to strike,” and agricultural workers are not exempted.102  The
Federal Labor Law reiterates these rights and sets out the rules for
collective bargaining.103  Substantive guarantees of union rights are
strong, but enforcement is weak or, more precisely, “selective.”104
In Mexico, registration of unions is mandatory105 and is a “pre-
requisite for the normal functioning of an organization.”106  With-
out being allowed to register, a union cannot gain legal status.
Legal status affords protections against anti-union retaliation,
grants standing to represent members in labor tribunals and
processes, and offers access to mechanisms for advancing mem-
bers’ interests and defending their rights.107
102. COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, THE RIGHTS OF NONSTANDARD
WORKERS: A NORTH AMERICAN GUIDE 19 (2003), http://new.naalc.org/english/pdf/
study1.pdf [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS]; see also PROTEC-
TION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 3, at 3; JOEL SOLOMON, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, MEXICO:  LABOR RIGHTS AND NAFTA—A CASE STUDY (1996), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Mexico3.htm (paraphrasing the Constitution of Mexico’s
Article 123(B)(10) as “[w]orkers will have the right to association to defend their
common interests.”).
103. For an overview of Mexican labor law, see Carlos Reynoso Castillo, Situacion
de Trabajo y Proteccion de los Trabajadores:  Estudio del caso de Mexico (1999), http:/
/www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/downloads/wpnr/mexico.pdf; COMPA,
supra note 15.
104. See COMPA, supra note 15, at 10 (describing the preferential enforcement of
laws favoring pro-government unions over independent unions and dissident
unionists).
105. Ley Federal del Trabajo [Federal Labor Law], art. 365, Diario Oficial de la
Federacio´n, 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/125.pdf.
106. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:  RIGHT OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS TO ESTAB-
LISH AND JOIN ORGANIZATIONS, ¶ 73 n.58 (1994), http://training.itcilo.it/ils/foa/li-
brary/general_surveys_en/25943.htm (describing Mexico as an example of a country
where “registration is compulsory.”).
107. See generally COMPA, supra note 15.
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Mexico has been roundly criticized for placing “excessive condi-
tions” amounting to previous authorization on unions seeking to
register.108  By delaying and denying registrations, among other
tactics, the official Mexican labor movement has quashed most ex-
pressions of independent unionism.  It would be highly likely that a
guestworker union seeking to register would face obstacles.  There
are two primary obstacles found in Mexico’s law—the requirement
of an employment relationship in Mexico and the ban on foreign-
ers as trade union officials—along with the practical reality that
registrations often are denied for completely arbitrary reasons.
There are reasons based in Mexican law to argue that neither the
employment relationship requirement nor the foreign officer ban
should be used to prohibit a guestworker union registration.
B. Obstacle 1: The Employment Relationship
Mexico is like most countries in conditioning the right to form a
union on the existence of a domestic employment relationship.109
Under the Mexican Constitution, “all workers within the national
territory regardless of occupation or status” are afforded the free-
dom of association and other rights.110  The baseline requirement is
a labor relationship (relacio´n de trabajo), defined as existing
“when, regardless of the origin of the relationship, a worker per-
forms subordinate work for another person in exchange for remu-
neration.”111  Some workers are excluded from collective labor
rights, such as “confidential” workers or family members working
108. Geraldo von Potobsky, Freedom of Association:  The Impact of Convention
No. 87 and ILO Action, 137 INT’L LAB. REV. 195, 206 (1998); see also COMPA, supra
note 15, at 15; SOLOMON, supra note 102.
109. See generally Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker? 34 INDUS. L.J. 57 (2005)
(describing general uses of employment relationship requirement); see also Guy
Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 BRIT. J.
OF INDUS. REL. 727 (2004); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relation-
ships:  A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357
(2002); Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Employed or Self-Employed? The Role and
Content of the Legal Distinction: Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors:  A
View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7 (1999); Alain Supiot, The Trans-
formation of Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe: A Multidisciplinary Per-
spective, 138 INT’L LAB. REV. 31, 36 (1999); Alan Hyde, What is Labor Law? (Cornell
Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-010, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=896381.
110. THE RIGHTS OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS, supra note 102, at 19.
111. Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, REPORT V(1) 20 (2006) ],
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-v-1.pdf [hereinafter
ILO, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP.
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for a family business,112 but the explicit exemptions are few and do
not include agricultural or guestworkers.
The problem for a guestworker union seeking to register is that
guestworkers do not actually perform subordinate work in Mexico
for pay.  If there is no employment relationship, there are no roots,
so to speak, in which the union can grow.  That seems
straightforward.
Guestworkers, however, have what are called “triangular em-
ployment relationships,” which makes the situation more compli-
cated.  “Triangular employment relationships” exist when workers
are “employed by an enterprise (the ‘provider’) who perform work
for a third party (the ‘user’).”113 Such employment relationships
may be “objectively ambiguous,” making it hard for workers to
know “what their rights are and who is responsible for them.”114
This ambiguity in guestworker relationships has to do with the
relative responsibilities of recruiters and the host country employ-
ers.  Most of those concerned with triangular employment relation-
ships have focused on ensuring that users of labor cannot escape
responsibility for obligations like paying wages, providing safe
workplaces, or bargaining when employees form a union, even if
they are not formally employers.115  The rationale behind this anal-
ysis is purposive; labor and employment laws are aimed at protect-
ing vulnerable workers so coverage should be broad to accomplish
that goal.116
Mexican law seems to share that goal of broad coverage.  Article
28, moreover, holds recruiters co-responsible with employers for
ensuring respect for an array of worker rights;117 this suggests that
the employment relationship is created when migrant workers are
hired in Mexico and rights guaranteed are enforceable either under
Mexican law or the employment law of the host country.  If there is
an employment relationship cognizable in Mexico for purposes of
112. THE RIGHTS OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS, supra note 102, at 19-20 (citing
Article 363 of the Mexican Constitution).
113. ILO, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 111, at 11.
114. Id.
115. See general discussions of employer responsibilities vis-a`-vis vulnerable em-
ployees in THE RIGHTS OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS, supra note 102, and the ILO,
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 111.
116. See generally ILO, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 111; see also
Leah Vosko, “Decent Work”:  The Shifting Role of the ILO and the Struggle for
Global Social Justice, 2 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 19 (2002); International Labour Organi-
zation R198, Employment Relationship Recommendation (2006), http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R198.
117. See Micah-Jones Email 2, supra note 79.
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enforcing minimum substantive guarantees, then there is no reason
to think the employment relationship should not also be recog-
nized for purposes of exercising union rights.
If there is an employment relationship and assuming the union
meets the formalities of registration,118 then the union registration
should not be denied simply because no work is actually performed
for pay in Mexico.  The union should have the right to carry out
actions with legal status, most notably protest abuses before tribu-
nals, bring parties to the table for bargaining,119 and participate in
social dialogue and other activities.
It is hard to picture how such a binational union would operate.
Under this analysis, a guestworker union could bargain with an em-
ployer in the host country, trying to hold recruiters responsible
through the top-down chain of command.  If that did not work, the
same union could then try to bring recruiters to the table in Mexico
to bargain, without the employer necessarily being present: one
job, two possible contracts.  Alternatively, one could imagine a sys-
tem in which a duly recognized union could negotiate jointly with
both Mexican recruiters and U.S. or Canadian employers, under
some transnational system of rules.  It seems awkward because the
organizational forms and coordination mechanisms for a binational
union are not yet worked out.  One of the difficulties of imagining
full representation of guestworkers in both home and host coun-
tries arises because there are not bilateral, regional, or interna-
tional models for coordination of labor regimes.  Guestworkers are
a prime example in which core labor rights of workers suggest that
new forms of coordination are needed, even though that would re-
quire adjusting notions of national sovereignty in labor relations.
C. Obstacle 2: The Ban on Foreign Trade Union Officers
The prohibition on foreigners as trade union officials is the sec-
ond obstacle likely to face a host country guestworker union seek-
118. CAN 2003-1, supra note 101, at 4(2)(1)(a) (stating that “[t]he legal require-
ments for obtaining registration are minimal and the granting of registration should
be a purely administrative act” and also pointing out that “Article 365 lists the docu-
ments the unions must submit in duplicate, which are:  an authorized copy of the
formative assembly proceedings; a list showing the number of union members with
their names and addresses, and the name and address of the employer, company or
establishment in which they are employed; an authorized copy of the union by-laws;
and an authorized copy of the assembly proceedings where the executive committee
was elected”).
119. Of course, there still would be a question of whether the labor tribunals had
any sort of jurisdiction over a foreign employer if it were not registered in the country
but just acted through agents.
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ing to register and operate in Mexico.  Under article 372 of
Mexico’s Federal Labor Law, no foreigners may serve as officers of
trade unions.120  This provision is connected to the constitutional
ban on foreign involvement in politics.121  The Mexican govern-
ment, in a case before the ILO’s Committee of Experts, explained
that section 372 “is based on the spirit of section 33 of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that foreigners may not in any way take part
in the political affairs of the country, although it is clear that trade
unions are established to defend the common interests of the work-
ers, and it is natural that their activities do not exclude acts of a
political nature.”122
If Mexican courts chose to apply this provision to top union of-
ficers,123 not just first-level or national-level organizations, then re-
gistration of a cross-border guestworker union would be
problematic under Mexican law.  An international guestworker
union likely would run afoul of this provision for purely democratic
reasons.  Guestworker unions like the UFW, FLOC, and UFCW
represent non-guestworker agricultural and/or other food workers
in foreign countries such as the U.S.  Guestworkers would be a mi-
nority in such unions.  As a result, the people elected to top union
office likely would be all or mostly foreigners and such a union
would probably fail to gain registration under Mexican law.
Despite such concerns, it is not clear that Mexican authorities
would apply this prohibition to a guestworker union attempting to
120. See PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 3, at 6.
121. See Constitucio´n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Constitution], as
amended, art. 33, Diario de la Federacio´n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), availa-
ble at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Mexico/mexico2004.html.
122. CEACR:  Individual Direct Request Concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Mexico (ratification:
1950) (1999), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=ilo
eng&document=9516&chapter=9&query=Mexico%40ref&highlight=&querytype=
bool&context=0 [hereinafter CEACR No. 87].
123. No Mexican court or other cases were found addressing this issue in a search
made by a Mexican labor attorney.   Memo, Ben Davis, Mexican Representative, Am.
Ctr. for Int’l Lab. Solidarity (Jan. 2007) (on file with author).  The provision might be
applied to top officers simply because they are the named officers or because the
union’s constitution or bylaws delegate specific responsibilities to officers in relation
to Mexican units.  For example, the Constitution of the United Steelworkers of
America states that “The International Union shall be the contracting party in all
collective bargaining agreements and all such agreement shall be signed by the inter-
national officers.”  Constitution of Int’l Union, United Steelworkers et al., art. XVII,
§ 1 (2005), http://erds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (Search File Number 000-094,
then select STEELWORKERS AFL-CIO NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 0, then
select 2005InternationalConstitution-FINAL-PROTECTED VERSION.pdf).  This
might be the sort of provision that creates an issue under Article 372.
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register.  If it did, another constitutional provision could come into
play.  Mexico’s Constitution requires the incorporation of princi-
ples from ratified treaties, such as International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) Conventions, into domestic law.  Article 133 of the
Constitution states that “duly signed and ratified international la-
bor conventions form part of domestic labor law of Mexico, insofar
as they are to workers’ benefit.”124  Should there be a conflict be-
tween the Federal Labor Law and a ratified ILO Convention, then
according to the Mexican government, “the text of the Convention
would prevail wherever it is to the advantage of the worker.  The
Government adds that the foregoing is established in article 133 of
the Constitution which gives the Convention precedence over all
other laws and incorporates it into domestic legislation.”125  Where
the Mexican Constitution, Federal Labor Law, and international
treaties do not clearly address an issue, article 18 of the Federal
Labor Law states that one should look to the general principles in
articles 2 and 3 of the Federal Labor Law for guidance; where there
is ambiguity, it should be resolved in favor of the workers.126
The ILO on a number of occasions has criticized the article 372
prohibition as being overly broad.  Article 3 of ILO Convention 87
on Freedom of Association states that workers’ organizations have
the right “to elect their representatives in full freedom” and pro-
hibits public authorities from “any interference which would re-
strict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.”127  This right
“is an indispensable condition for [unions] to be able to act in full
124. PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 3, at 26; see also Constitucio´n
Politica [Constitution], supra note 121.
125. CEACR:  Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 90, Night Work
of Young Persons (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1948 Mexico (ratification: 1956)
(1994), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/single.pl?query=061994MEX090@ref&chspec
=06.  The government outlined the process but denied there was a conflict between
the Convention and the domestic law in this case. Id.
126. Ley Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor Law], art. 18, Diario Oficial de
la Federacio´n [D.O.], 1 de April de 1970 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.
mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/125.pdf (“[I]nterpretacio´n de las normas de trabajo se tomara´n
en consideracio´n sus finalidades sen˜aladas en los artı´culos 2o. y 3o.  En caso de duda,
prevalecera´ la interpretacio´n ma´s favorable al trabajador [interpretation of the labor
statutes should take into consideration the goals identified in articles 2 and 3.  Where
there is doubt, the interpretation most favorable to the worker should prevail].”).  For
the goals identified in articles 2 and 3 of the Federal Labor Law, see generally Ley
Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor Law], art. 2, 3, Diario Oficial de la Federa-
cio´n [D.O.], 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/125.pdf.
127. International Labour Organisation, Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize Convention, Convention No. 87, art. 3, July 9, 1948, http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/association.pdf.
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freedom and to promote effectively the interests of their mem-
bers.”128  Because this is an indispensable part of freedom of asso-
ciation rights, governments must “refrain from any intervention . . .
in determining the conditions of eligibility of leaders . . . .”129  The
prohibition on foreigners in office is one such problematic condi-
tion on eligibility to register as a union, and the ILO has taken the
position that “[l]egislation should be made flexible so as to permit
the organizations to elect their leaders freely and without hin-
drance, and to permit foreign workers access to trade union posts
. . . .”130  In 2001, the ILO’s Committee of Experts expressed,
“the firm hope that the Government will find the most appropri-
ate formula for amending the above provision so that foreign
workers have access to trade union office, at least after a reason-
able period of residency in the host country, or where there is
reciprocity between countries, for at least a specific proportion
of trade union officers.”131
If Mexico were to apply article 372 of the Mexican Federal La-
bor Law to a guestworker union, it would create a conflict between
a federal labor law and the ratified ILO convention.  The conven-
tion, per article 133 of the constitution, should trump the Federal
Labor Law provision.
That would not completely clarify the situation because the ILO
convention does not say that no restriction is allowed; reasonable
restrictions could require a certain proportion of union officers to
be Mexican nationals or take other forms.  One could imagine, for
example, new regulations requiring that Mexican unions be able to
disaffiliate with an international union without facing significant
obstacles.  There are precedents for this sort of rule, although
mostly in debates within trade union federations or international
unions with both U.S. and Canadian affiliates about how best to
balance concerns of national sovereignty and international union-
ism.132  One could imagine a country like Mexico with great con-
128. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREE-
DOM OF ASSOCIATION 187 ¶ 789 (2007), http://www.oit.org/public/english/standards/
relm/gb/docs/gb299/pdf/gb-4-1.pdf.
129. Id.
130. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS (RIGHT OF OR-
GANIZATIONS TO ELECT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN FULL FREEDOM) ¶. 420 (2006),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&docu
ment=226&chapter=23&query=%23docno%3D2320060703&highlight=on&query
type=bool.
131. CEACR No. 87, supra note 122.
132. Preserving the sovereignty of national unions has been a critical issue—some
argue the critical issue—in the creation and, even more, the break up of U.S.-Cana-
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cerns about foreign domination and national sovereignty seeking
to regulate in new ways in the face of any move toward interna-
tional unionism.  Although such regulations would be problematic
for other reasons, the point is that the nature of “reasonable re-
strictions” in the context of binational guestworker unions is
unexplored.
It seems clear that the ban on foreign trade union officers should
not be used to prevent a guestworker union from registering.  It is
less clear whether a different form of regulation might be available
and appropriate to protect unions and Mexican politics from “for-
eign” interference.133
CONCLUSION: BINATIONAL UNIONISM:  A CHALLENGE
TO DOMESTIC REGIMES
The idea of a binational guestworker union opens up many pos-
sibilities for moving toward full representation of guestworkers by
creating a vibrant organization that can represent workers through-
out the work cycle, play a meaningful role in the transnational lives
and communities of guestworkers, and advocate for the interests
and needs of a particularly vulnerable group of workers using all
the tools available on both sides of the border.
Jennifer Gordon recently laid out a fascinating picture of what a
transnational representation system involving U.S. and Mexican
dian unions.  In 2000, eight locals of the Canadian branch of the Service Employees
International Union (“SEIU”) tried to leave SEIU and affiliate with the Canadian
Auto Workers. See generally Paul Weinberg, Showdown in Uniontown; it Began with
an Exodus of Workers from a US Union, the SEIU, to the CAW, 34 THIS MAGAZINE
30 (2000).  According to supporters of the breakaway unions, “the SEIU saga is sim-
ply the latest round in a fight that should have been resolved years ago—the right of
Canadian workers to determine their own future within, or without, a U.S. parent
labour organization.” Id.  Canadian union leaders had been attempting to re-negoti-
ate the terms to create something like “Canadian self-determination with ‘fraternal
ties’ to the SEIU.” Id.  International union leaders, on the other hand, argued that
decisions should be centralized so that the union could focus resources on moving an
industry strategy, even if that meant relatively more attention went to organizing in
unorganized areas in the U.S. as opposed to representing already-organized workers
in Canada. Id.
133. Of course, it would be somewhat hypocritical for Mexican authorities to en-
courage Mexicans to participate in guestwork programs, as the government has done,
and to promote binational political involvement, as the government also has done, but
then restrict the involvement of a guestworker union in domestic politics. See Sonya
Geis, Registration is Low for Mexico’s Absentee Vote, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2006, at
A12.  Mexico does not have a lock on hypocrisy.  One could equally imagine U.S. or
Canadian unions abandoning the small group of organized guestworkers should it
seem possible to organize domestic workers in larger numbers and end guestworker
programs.
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workers might look like.134  One might disagree with any or all of
the specifics, but what she offers is a more advanced vision of full
representation—active, comprehensive, and balancing concerns
about autonomy and coordination.135  The recent successes of
guestworker organizing point to the need for some vision of where
we are heading and what legal challenges we might encounter
along the way.  It is important to focus on such a vision because
“[u]ntil the right to organize, to protest, to work, and to move tran-
scends national boundaries, guestworker programs will remain
what they have always been: the means to create a class of perfect
immigrants who live in a no-man’s land, outside the bounds of na-
tionhood and the house of labor.”136
134. See generally Gordon, supra note 68.
135. Id.
136. Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants, supra note 4, at 94.
